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Personal Property Security Law Reform in
Australia and New Zealand: The Impetus

for Change
Anthony Duggan & Michael Gedye*
Assume a period some time in the early part of the twentieth century.
Country A introduced a telephone system some years back. Country
B's government is now proposing to do likewise. A consortium of
stakeholders, led by postal workers and stationery manufacturers,
oppose the initiative on the ground that Country B has a postal
service that works perfectly well. They point out that the postal
service in Country A was always problematic because vast distances
and harsh winters made deliveries unreliable but they say Country B
does not have the same problems because it is much smaller and the
climate is better. They concede that Country B's communications
system could be improved, but they argue that only modest changes
are needed: for example, the government might consider centralizing
postal operations, which are currently run on a regional basis, and it
might consider allowing postmen (no post-women in those days) to
ride bicycles. They are ambivalent about a proposal to offer
additional services, in particular, a telegram service, because they
fear that telegram-writing might corrupt proper letter-writing. They
argue that introducing telephones would be a bad idea because some
people may have trouble learning to use them. There may be other
adverse implications that have not occurred to anyone yet, and at
least we know where we stand with the postal
service. Question:
I
how should Country B's government respond?

* Faculty of Law, University of Toronto and Business School, University of
Auckland, respectively. Our thanks to Tom Telfer for helpful comments. All errors are
ours.
1. Anthony Duggan, Submission to the Australian Commonwealth Attorney
General's Department on Review of the Law on Personal Property Securities: Discussion
Paper 1-Registrationand Search Issues, 2 (May 2007) (on file with author).
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INTRODUCTION

Australian and New Zealand secured transactions laws share a
common history. But they took different paths, at least temporarily, in2
1999 when New Zealand enacted a Personal Property Securities Act
based on the Canadian version of Article 9 of the United States Uniform
Commercial Code. Australian personal property security law reform
lagged behind, but there has been renewed activity over the past two
years or so, culminating in the release of a draft Personal Property
Securities Bill a few months ago.
An interesting feature of the Australian and New Zealand
experiences is the relative ease with which New Zealand managed the
reform process and the equanimity, if not enthusiasm, with which the
legal profession and other stakeholders greeted the proposals.3 In
Australia, by contrast, personal property security law reform at least until
recently has been dogged by a lack of political will, at best lukewarm
support from the banks and other financial institutions and strong
opposition from within the legal profession. This difference is curious
given the close cultural, economic and political similarities between the
two countries, their geographical proximity and their commitment to the
harmonization of Australasian business laws via the Australia and New
Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement.
Our aims in this paper are to: (1) explain why lawyers tend to
oppose Article 9-type personal property security law reform;
(2) critically analyze the reform opponents' main arguments; and
(3) identify the key factors behind the impetus for change in Australia
and New Zealand. We also comment briefly on the Australian Draft Bill
and the New Zealand PPSA, with emphasis on the dangers of reinventing the wheel. This is a lesson which the New Zealanders, to their
credit, for the most part have taken to heart but which, to the potential
prejudice of a successful legislative outcome, the Australians continue to
ignore.4
In Part II, below we provide a short historical account of the reform
movements in the two countries. In Part III, we compare and contrast the
legal profession's reactions to the reforms in Australia and New Zealand.
In Part IV, we identify the factors that provided the impetus for change,
looking first at Australia and then New Zealand. In Part V, we make

2. See Personal Property Securities Act 1999 (N.Z.) [hereinafter NZPPSA 1999].
3. Although there was a considerable time lag between the date when the proposals
for Article 9-type reforms were first floated in New Zealand and the enactment of the
legislation. See Part II B, below.
4. Although the New Zealand legislation does depart from the Canadian model in a
number of respects. See Part V B, below.
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some brief remarks about the recently released Australian Draft Bill,
followed by some observations about the New Zealand PPSA. Part VI
concludes.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A.

Australia

The defects in the Australian personal property security laws have
been well documented.5 The history of proposals for law reform has
been long and tortured and this, too, has been well documented.6 But for
David Allan's unflagging efforts, the cause may well have been lost for
good in 1993, following the Australian Law Reform Commission's illconsidered recommendations for a home-grown PPSA.7 Professor Allan
almost single-handedly managed to keep the issue alive, by convening
stakeholder workshops at Bond University in 1995 and 2002, 8 by
exploiting his connections with the Banking Law Association and,
generally, by taking every available opportunity to prod reluctant
governments into action.
The current chapter in the saga was sparked by a truly Pythonesque

episode. The then Commonwealth Attorney-General, Philip Ruddock,
was to be the keynote speaker at a combined Queensland Law
Society/Queensland Bar Association symposium in 2005. He arrived
early and, to kill time, decided to sit in on one of the presentations
currently under way. By chance, the presentation he walked in on was

Professor Allan making the case, again, for personal property security
law reform. Allan's remarks captured Ruddock's attention and, at the
end of the session, in an actualization of every academic's dream,

Ruddock introduced himself, congratulated Allan on his presentation and
5. See AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMM'N, REPORT No.64, PERSONAL PROPERTY
SECURITIES (1993), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/
reports/64/Report 64.txt; see also Anthony Duggan & Simon Begg, Victoria Law
Reform Commission & Queensland Law Reform Commission, Personal Property
Securities Law: A Blueprintfor Reform (QLRC DP, No.39 & VLRC DP No. 28) (1992);
David E. Allan, Patrick Quirk & Nicole Martin, Final Report-Workshop on Personal
Property Security Law Reform, 14 BOND L. REv. 8 (2002); Standing Comm. of
Attorneys-General, Review of the Law on PersonalProperty Securities-OptionsPaper

(Austl.) (2006), available at http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/agd.nsf/Page/Consultations
reformsandreviewspersonalpropertysecuritiesreformPPSDownloads;
Anthony Duggan,
Globalization of Secured Lending Law: Australian Developments, 34 INT'L LAW. 1107
(2000); Anthony Duggan, Personal Property Security Law Reform: The Australian

Experience to Date, 27 CAN. BUS. L.J. 17 (1996).
6. See id.
7. See id.; see also infra text accompanying note 15.
8. The proceedings of the 2002 workshop were published in a special issue of the
Bond Law Review. See 14 BOND L. REv. (2002).
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invited him to address the Standing Committee of State and
Commonwealth Attorneys-General ("SCAG") at its next meeting.
Following this meeting, the attorneys formed a working group to
examine the possibilities for reform and to develop proposals for further
consideration. 9 This led to the publication by SCAG in April 2006 of a
paper canvassing a range of reform options based on the New Zealand
Personal Property Securities Act 1999 and an Allan-sponsored draft
Bill. 10 In April 2007, the Council of Australian Governments agreed in
principle to establish a national system for the registration of personal
property security interests coupled with Commonwealth legislation to be
supported by a referral of legislative power by the States to the
Between November 2006 and April 2007 the
Commonwealth."1
Commonwealth Attorney-General's Department published three detailed
Discussion Papers which signified a clear commitment in principle to
Article 9-type reforms,' 2 while in the May 2007 federal budget, the
Australian government allocated $113.3 million over five years to fund
of legislation and the development of a national on-line
the enactment
3
'
register.
The most recent development was the release, on May 16, 2008, of
a draft Bill for public comment with a submission deadline of August 15,
2008.14 Sadly, Professor Allan died before these latest developments
took place and so he will not see the fruits of his labours. On the other
hand, he must have known that the signs were promising following the
2005 SCAG Meeting and the prospect of movement at last would have
given him considerable satisfaction. Ironically, Philip Ruddock has also
been denied the opportunity of seeing the project through to completion.
9. See Australian Government Attorney-General's Department, available at
http://www.ag.gov.au/pps [hereinafter AGA-GD].
10. See supra note 5.
11. See Personal Property Securities Reform, supra note 9.
12. See AGA-GD, Discussion Paper 1: Registration and Search Issues (2006),
available at http://www.ag.gov.au/pps (follow "PPS Downloads" hyperlink; then follow
"Registration and Search Issues" hyperlink); see also AGA-GD, Discussion Paper 2:
Extinguishment, Priorities,Conflict of Laws, Enforcement, Insolvency (2007), available
at http://www.ag.gov.au/pps (follow "PPS Downloads" hyperlink; then follow
"Extinguishment, Priorities" hyperlink); AGA-GD, Discussion Paper 3: Possessory
Security Interests (2007), available at http://www.ag.gov.au/pps (follow "PPS
Downloads" hyperlink; then follow "Possessory Security Interest" hyperlink). For
purposes of clarity, hereinafter we refer to these collectively as "Discussion Papers."
13. AGA-GD, Media Release: Personal Property Securities Reform (2007),
available at http://www.ag.gov.au/pps (follow "PPS Downloads" hyperlink; then follow
"Media Releases" hyperlink; then follow "Personal Property Securities Reform"
hyperlink).
14. See Personal Property Securities Bill 2008 (Austl.) (Consultation Draft),
available at www.ag.gov.au/pps (follow "PPS Downloads" hyperlink; then follow
"Exposure Draft Personal Property Securities Bill 2008" hyperlink).
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His party was voted out of office in the November 2007 federal election
and his opposition counterpart, who is now in the driver's seat, will
probably 15end up getting the credit for the initiative assuming it
succeeds.
B.

New Zealand

The New Zealand reform history is almost as long but somewhat
less tortured than in Australia. Defects in New Zealand's prior secured
transactions law were documented from as early as the 1950's.16 In 1967
the Legal Research Foundation, a highly regarded private law reform
body that draws its membership from the legal profession, the judiciary
and academia, commenced research into the possibility of reforming the
New Zealand law by enacting a secured transactions statute based on
Article 9, as was then occurring in Ontario. Around the same time,
Professor Riesenfeld, a North American academic who was visiting New
Zealand, famously described the then New Zealand law as a "quagmire,"
a metaphor that proved to be enduring.1 7 Further calls for reform were
made in 1973, 1982 and 1984. I1 But the most important initiatives came
from the New Zealand Law Commission in 1988 and 1989 with the
publication of its Preliminary Paper No. 6, Reform of PersonalProperty
Security Law, and Report No. 8, A PersonalProperty Securities Act for
New Zealand, both publications strongly endorsing the enactment of an
Article 9 type regime. The authors of the initial report described the
problem in the following terms:
The law relating to security over chattels and intangibles in New
Zealand is in a mess.... The principal reason for the mess is that
New Zealand inherited the English Bills of Sale legislation (itself a
15. The new Attorney-General is Robert McLelland. In an address to the Institute
for Factors and Discounters on 6 March 2008, he gave credit to a previous Labor
government for initiating personal property security law reform in the 1990s and went on
to give his own government credit for "injecting renewed vigour into the regulatory
reform agenda." Robert McLelland, Australia Attorney General, Institute for Factors and
Discounters (IFD) Annual Luncheon Speech (Mar. 6, 2008), available at
http://www.ag.gov.au/pps (follow "PPS Downloads" then follow "Media Releases"
hyperlink; then follow "IFD Annual Luncheon" hyperlink).
16.

See generally Cain, The Chattels Transfer Act: Oddities and Oddments, 35 NZLJ

86(1959).
17.

See S.

Reisenfeld,

The Quagmire of Chattels Security in New Zealand

(Auckland: New Zealand, Legal Research Found. 1970). The metaphor was frequently
repeated over the years. For example, see The New Zealand Law Commission's
Preliminary Paper 6, Reform of PersonalPropertySecurity Law, at 10 (1988).

18. See The Contract and Commercial Law Reform Committee 1973 Chattels
Securities Report to the Minister of Justice; Mr. D. F. Dugdale's 1982 report on
Australian developments; and a 1984 Ministerial Working Party review of registration of
company charges.
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mess) and the relevant provisions of the companies legislation (an
incomplete security system) and adapted them to local needs,
sometimes in a desultory way.
Farrar and O'Regan identified the main reasons for the then
unsatisfactory state of the New Zealand law as being.
(a)

the lack of any functional basis for the law;

(b)

conceptual difficulty and confusion;

(c)

the incompleteness and incoherence of the statutory
registration schemes.2 °

These reasons are as applicable in Australia and the United Kingdom
(and indeed elsewhere) as they then were in New Zealand.
Although the New Zealand Law Commission and its advisers saw
an urgent need for reform, 2' another 10 years passed before the New
Zealand Personal Property Securities Act was finally enacted in 1999.
The delay was not due to any significant stakeholder opposition; in
contrast to Australia and the United Kingdom, affected groups either
actively supported the reforms or at least did not oppose them. The delay
was due in part to the priority given to company law reform at large, in
part to the absence of a particular champion within government to
promote the reforms and in part to a desire to await the outcome of
Australian reform initiatives. However, when by 1993 there still seemed
to be no immediate prospect of Australia adopting a similar secured
transactions regime, New Zealand decided to go it alone. In March
1993, the Minister of Justice gave the green light to the Law
Commission's recommendations. There was no change to this position
when later in 1993 the Australian Law Reform Commission produced
what New Zealand regarded as unsatisfactory proposals for Australia.
But it was not until the commercial law reform responsibilities of the
Ministry of Justice were transferred to the Ministry of Economic
Development, which doubtless saw the potential economic benefits of
the reform more clearly than the Justice Ministry, that real progress was
19.

Preliminary Paper No. 6, Reform of Personal Property Security Law, at 10

(1988) (reporting by Professor John Farrar and Mark O'Regan to the New Zealand Law
Commission).
20. Id.
21. "We believe that the time has come to stop talking about the inadequacies of the
current law relating to personal property securities which have been recognised for over
20 years, and to take immediate action to reform the law to overcome those
inadequacies." Id.
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made. The Ministry of Economic Development reviewed and endorsed
the Law Commission's proposals and the legislation was finally enacted
in 1999.
III. THE LEGAL PROFESSION'S REACTIONS
A.

Australia
It is probably fair to say that, up until the most recent events

described above, the legal profession in Australia was, by and large, at
worst hostile and at best indifferent to Article 9-type reform of the
personal property securities laws. There were at least five inter-related
factors to which this essentially negative response can be attributed.
1.

The Difficulty of the Subject-Matter

The law of secured credit is not easy. It comprises elements of
corporate law, sale of goods and hire-purchase law, mortgage law,
property law and the law of contracts as well as numerous registration
statutes, many of them technical and arcane. Lack of sufficient expertise
across all these subject areas almost certainly left many lawyers
incapable of properly assessing the case for reform. For those uncertain
about change, the status quo will often be the most comfortable option.
In other words, uncertainty promotes a "better the devil you know" kind
of response: see, further, (No.5), below.
2.

The Nature of the Legislation and the Unfamiliarity of Key

Concepts
Compounding the difficulty of the basic subject-matter is the
opaqueness of the Article 9 model and the unfamiliarity of its key
concepts. Unlike the ordinary run of statutes, it is not possible to read
Article 9 or a Canadian PPSA from cover to cover and come away with a
working knowledge of what it is about. Article 9 has its own internal
logic which requires mastery before the secrets of the statute can be
unlocked.
The key concepts of attachment and perfection and the relationship
between them are part of this internal logic. Attachment and perfection
are simply old wine in new bottles, in other words, they are no more than
new and economical means of expressing well-established common law
principles. However, there is a tendency for the novelty of the
expressions to mask the familiarity of the ideas they represent and this
can make newcomers to the legislation nervous. The Article 9/PPSA
priority rules and the relationship between them are another source of
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anxiety. The rules are for the most part easy to apply in practice, but
they can be hard to understand in the abstract and it is in the nature of
things that the newcomer to the legislation is likely first to encounter the
rules in the abstract.
3.

Distrust of American Law

At least until recently, the Australian legal tradition was a strongly
Anglo-centric one. There was a heavy emphasis in law schools on
English cases; far more graduate students went to Oxford or Cambridge
than to Harvard or Yale. Courts regularly cited English authorities and
much less frequently relied on case law from other jurisdictions and
much Australian statute law, particularly in the commercial area, was
English in origin (the Companies Acts, the Bills of Exchange Act, the
sale of goods legislation, the bills of sale statutes and the hire-purchase
laws are a few examples that come readily to mind). In summary, if the
need arose for law teachers, courts and legislatures to borrow, the
tendency was to look to England. The tendency is somewhat less
pronounced these days (for example, Australian courts now quite
regularly cite Canadian cases and even, occasionally, American ones,
while, on the legislative front, the States have replaced their English
model money-lending and hire-purchase laws with American style truthin-lending and consumer credit laws). On the other hand, old habits die
hard and the bias persists. American law and legal institutions are more
alien than English ones and, therefore, are liable to be treated with
suspicion. Article 9 is doubly cursed in this regard: not only is it
American, but also it is markedly different in style and approach from
the English model laws Australian practitioners are used to.
4.

The Irresistible Urge to Reinvent the Wheel

Perhaps partly on account of the factors identified in (No.2) and
(No.3), above, law reformers who support the basic Article 9/PPSA
philosophy have nevertheless proved reluctant to copy the Article
9/PPSA drafting. There is a tendency to think we can do it better
ourselves and also to assume, without proper inquiry, that differences in
Australian economic conditions, financial transactions and legal practice
justify departure from the North American model. The Australian Law
Reform Commission's 1993 report on personal property securities is the
most prominent example of this way of thinking. One problem with
taking a radically different drafting approach is that it increases the risk
of error. Article 9 and the PPSAs have been tried and tested and they are
the product of careful and extensive deliberation. New legislation,
drafted in haste, might not work as well-or at all. A decision to
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reinvent the wheel puts a premium on knowing what you are doing and
why. 2 The Australian Law Reform Commission's view was that the
Article 9/PPSA model was unsuitable for adoption in Australia because it
was too radically different in substance and drafting style from current
Australian laws. The ALRC preferred to reinvent the wheel, producing a
draft bill which looked nothing like Article 9 or the PPSAs. The bill was
roundly criticized by the ALRC's North American consultants and, while
this was a justified reaction, it had the effect of fuelling stakeholders'
doubts about the wisdom of reforming the law at all.
5.

Better the Devil You Know

The factors identified in 1-4, above, all contributed to a "better the
devil you know" attitude: law reform may make things worse and, to
avoid the risk, we should stick with the tried and true. What we have
may not be optimal, but at least we know where we stand. The concern
with transition costs, including the costs to lenders and their legal
advisors of becoming familiar with the new legislation and adapting
documents and systems, is a variation on the same theme. There is no
denying that Article 9-type reforms involve transition costs but, as the
Canadian experience demonstrates, these costs are substantially
outweighed by the benefits over the longer term. A fixation on transition
costs can easily develop into the "better the devil you know" attitude
described above and this, in turn, tends to stultification.24
Times have changed and there is more support now for the reforms
within the legal profession than there used to be. Nevertheless, there is
still some significant opposition, particularly from a number of the larger
law firms. The Law Council of Australia's submissions on the 20062007 Discussion Papers 25 reveal a sharp division of opinion. The
submissions endorse "efforts to reform this area of law" and
acknowledge that "the existing system is unnecessarily complex, with
gaps, inconsistencies and out-dated formal requirements." However,
they go on to say:
members of the Committee have not been able to reach a consensus
as to whether some aspects of the reform should be supported. These
include:
22. See Jacob S. Ziegel, Canadian Perspectives on Chattel Security Law Reform in
the United Kingdom, 54 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 430, 441 (1995).
23. See PersonalPropertySecurity Law Reform, supra note 5, at 181-84.
24. The new Attorney-General acknowledged this point in his address to the Institute

of Factors and Discounters: "The reforms have encountered several road blocks along the
way. For many, it was easier to live with the existing complex and expensive system
than to change it." See McLelland, supra note 15.
25. See Discussion Papers, supra note 12.
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*

codification of the general law relating to security
interests or otherwise altering the existing substantive
law except where a specific need exists;

"

enshrining the "in substance" or "functional" approach
as a key feature of the reforms; and

"

re-characterising interests that are not formally security
interests as security interests for the purpose of
registration or otherwise.

While some members
of the Committee support these reforms, others
26
oppose them.

Contrary to what the opening words imply, these points of disagreement
go to more than matters of detail. They are fundamental to the entire
Article 9 endeavour. As such, they are inconsistent with the broad
statements of support for the reforms which appear in the submissions'
opening paragraph.
The reform opponents' main objections can be summarized as
follows:
*

the Article 9/PPSA model is too complex;

*

Article 9 is not relevant to Australia; and

*

Article 9's functional approach to secured transactions
confuses ownership with security interests.

27
These are similar to the objections raised by professional organizations
to the Law Commission's 2004 proposals 28 for Article 9-type reforms in
England and Wales. 29 The following is a short critical account of the
points listed above.

26.

Financial Services Committee, Business Law Section, Law Council of Australia,

Review of the Law on Personal Property Securities: Submission in Response to
Discussion Paper 1: Registration and Search Issues (June 2007),
1, 2. These

statements were repeated in the submissions on Discussion Papers 2 and 3.
27. The main opposition came from the Financial Committee of the City of London
Law Society, see

LAW COMM'N, CO.

SEC. INTERESTS,

2005, CM. 6654, and the

Association of Business Recovery Professionals.
28.

See LAW COMM'N, CO. SEC. INTERESTS: A CONSULTATIVE REPORT, 2004,

Consultation Paper No. 176.
29. See Jacob Zeigel, The Travails of English Chattel Security Law Reform-A
Transatlantic View, 2006 LLOYD'S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 110 (2006) (providing a critical
account of both submissions); see also Hugh Beale, The Exportability of North American
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The complexity of Article 9

According to the Law Council of Australia's submissions, the main
reason for opposition to the proposed reforms is "the significant increase
in complexity of the laws" the reforms would entail" and this is "a
compelling reason" not to adopt them. 30 The following is a fuller
statement of this concern:
[t]he proposed priorities regime.., is significantly more complex
than the existing rules applying under Australian law.... Although
there will be a new registration system, covering a broader range of
security interests, registration will not determine priority in all cases.
The outcome of any particular priority dispute may depend on the
order of registration of security interests, the 'category' of personal
property over which the competing security interests are held and the
way in which both the grantor of the security interest and the holders
of the competing security interests held the property.
The complexity of the NZ priority regime is evidenced by the manner
in which the legislation classifies personal property. There are seven
primary categories of personal property including chattel paper,
documents of title, goods, intangibles, investment securities, money
and negotiable instruments. The definition of goods alone contains
nine sub-classifications, including consumer goods, equipment and
inventory.
Under the NZ regime there are approximately 70 priority rules.
There is no need to adopt such a complex set of priority rules. This
complexity undermines
the certainty that a single register system is
31
intended to provide.

Chattel Security Regimes: The Fate of the English Law Commission's Proposals, 43
CAN. Bus. L.J. 178 (2006).

30. See Financial Services Committee, supra note 26. See Financial Services
Committee, Business Law Section, Law Council of Australia, Review of the Law on
Personal Property Securities: Submission in Response to Discussion Paper 2, at 1
(2007). The committee repeats its opposition in its submission on Discussion Paper 3.
See Financial Services Committee, Business Law Section, Law Council of Australia,
Review of the Law on Personal Property Securities: Submission in Response to
Discussion Paper 3, at 1 (2007).
31. Angela Flannery & Greta Burkett, Personal Property Securities Reform in
Australia, 23 AUSTL. BANKING & FIN. LAW BULL. 23, 24 (2007). The authors are both
with Clayton Utz, a leading law firm. The passage is not a fair or accurate reflection of
the New Zealand legislation. We are unsure how Flannery and Burkett arrived at the
figures they quote. There are three subcategories of goods: consumer goods, equipment,
and inventory. Other types of goods, such as crops, are mentioned out of an abundance
of caution to preclude any possible argument they are not goods. Motor vehicles and
aircraft are subject to serial number registration requirements, but it is no more accurate
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The complaint that there are too many rules calls to mind the
Austrian Emperor Joseph II's reputed gripe to Mozart that Don Giovanni
had too many notes, and it is hardly less fatuous. The key question, of
course, is too many compared to what? According to the AttorneyGeneral's Department's reckoning, there are currently "at least 77
separate Acts governing PPS in Australia, administered by 30 separate
Commonwealth, State, and Territory government departments and
agencies. 32 Moreover, as Discussion Paper 1 points out:
registration and search vary according to jurisdiction, the nature of
the collateral, the kind of security interest or whether the debtor is a
natural person or a company. Some interests are required to be
registered on more than one register to gain protection while for
others there is no available register at all.3 3
It is hard to accept the assertion that the proposed legislation is more
complex than the current laws, and it is ironic that the number of priority
rules the critics say the proposed legislation contains almost exactly
matches the number of registration statutes the new law will replace.
Moreover, as Ziegel points out in the context of the English debate on
personal property security law reform, the implication that the current
laws are "clear, flexible and predictable" relative to the Article 9/PPSA
model is belied by the volume of secured lending transactions
that are
"successfully concluded each year in Canada and the U.S., 3 4
b.

The Irrelevance of Article 9

A partner in one of the leading Australian law firms was reported in
the Australian FinancialReview 12 months ago as saying that Article 9
was introduced in the United States "in 1951 and in the context of a legal
system which didn't recognize equity. 3 5 The revelation that there was
no equity in the United States will no doubt come as a posthumous shock
to the likes of James Kent, John Pomeroy, and Joseph Story, and it is

to refer to them as a subcategory than it would be for any other type of goods. We have
never counted the number of priority rules-there seems little point-but the prudent
secured creditor who registers need be concerned with only a few.
32. AGA-GD, Review of Personal Property Securities Information Sheet (Nov.
2006), available at http://www.ag.gov.au/pps (follow "PPS Downloads" hyperlink; then
follow "Additional Downloads" hyperlink; then select "PPS reform information sheet").
The legislation is listed in Attachment D of the Department's Options Paper. See
Standing Comm. of Attorneys-General, supra note 5, at 24-25.
33. See Discussion Paper1: Registration& Search Issues, supra note 12, at 1.
34. See Zeigel, supra note 29, at 118.
35. See Marcus Priest, Need for Federal Plan Questioned,AusTL. FIN. REV., June 1,
2007, at 63.
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unclear whether the speaker was being deliberately mischievous or was
simply uninformed.
A third, and perhaps more likely, possibility is that the speaker was
misquoted, and what she meant to say was that United States law did not
recognize the floating charge and Article 9 was enacted to cure this
deficiency. The implication is that, because the floating charge is part of
Australian law, there is no need for Article 9-type reforms in Australia.
The argument overlooks the fact that the floating charge was part of prePPSA law in Canada and New Zealand, but this did not stop the
Canadians or New Zealanders from going down the Article 9 road.
36
The truth, of course, is that the need to reverse Benedict v. Ratner
was only one reason for the enactment of Article 9. Aside from the lack
of the floating charge, pre-Article 9 secured lending law in the United
States had many of the same features as the current Australian law,
including "a multiplicity of legal, equitable and statutory security devices
each with its own rules, many of them quite unsuited to modem
37
financing requirements and leading to equally uncommercial results.
The need to reduce the number of registers is reason enough for reform,
but, as most law reformers have discovered, it turns out to be hard to
achieve this objective without also introducing substantive rules that are
uniform across the different forms of transaction.
c.

The Heresy of Article 9

The third commonly voiced objection to the Article 9 model is that
"hire-purchase agreements, conditional sale agreements and other quasisecurities are not true security interests and should not be governed by
the same principles as apply to mortgages and charges. To merge the
two ... is to confuse what 'I owe' with what 'I own."' 38 The argument
goes to the heart of Article 9's functional approach to the treatment of
secured transactions and, at least as commonly presented, implies that a
registration requirement is warranted for mortgages and charges, but not
for hire-purchase agreements, conditional sales, and the like. This, of
course, amounts to a defence of the status quo as represented by the
system for registration of company charges.
By way of justification for discriminating between forms of
transaction, Flannery and Burkett argue that extending the registration
36.

Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925) (determining that debtor could not use

proceeds from accounts because using the proceeds would preclude the effective creation
of a lien).
37.
38.

See Ziegel, supra note 29, at 115.
This is how Ziegel states the argument before dismantling it. See id. at 116. For

a statement of the argument in the Australian context, see Flannery & Burkett, supra note
31.
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requirement to title retention arrangements may lead to parties being
taken unfairly by surprise:
the consequences of non-registration are severe. If a security interest
is not registered it may be defeated by other secured creditors of an
insolvent debtor. For lessors, suppliers and consignors, this will
mean that they may lose title to their goods 39if they inadvertently fail
to register their interests on the new register.
As it happens, the first two cases decided under the New Zealand PPSA,
Graham v. Portacom NZ Ltd40 and Waller v. New Zealand Bloodstock4
involved this very scenario of lessors failing to register, and, at least in
Australia, both cases have become rallying points for opponents of the
new law.42
However, any concerns these cases have prompted are
misconceived. The potential for unfair surprise in the new laws is no
more than an aspect of the transition costs parties face in adapting to the
new regime.43 These transition costs are justifiable on the assumption
that they will be outweighed by the benefits of the new law in the longerterm. Moreover, if there is a problem, it will likely prove to be selfcorrecting. It should take only one or two cases like Portacom and New
Zealand Bloodstock for lessors, suppliers and consignors to get the
message that the new law applies to them and that they need to register
financing statements. 4 It can safely be predicted that there will not be
too many more cases like this in New Zealand and that the courts will be
free to turn their attention to more interesting questions.
B.

New Zealand

As mentioned earlier, stakeholder groups in New Zealand, including
lawyers, either actively supported the proposed personal property
39. See Flannery & Burkett, supra note 31, at 23-24.
40. Graham v. Portacom N.Z. Ltd., [2004] 2 NZLR 528 (H.C.).
41. Waller v. N.Z. Bloodstock Ltd., [2004] 2 NZLR 549 (H.C.).
42. The Australian government was sufficiently persuaded by these arguments to
include in the draft Personal Properties Securities Bill 2008 a provision aimed at
protecting the holder of an unperfected security interest pursuant to a true lease or
consignment from the consequences of the rule that an unperfected security interest is
invalid in the debtor's bankruptcy or liquidation. See infra app. pt. t (k). The provision is
arguably misguided for the reasons stated in the text and Appendix.
43. The real surprise in Portacom and New Zealand Bloodstock is that the lessors
failed to register, despite extensive campaigns by government and professional bodies
aimed at informing affected persons of the need to do so. See Portacom, 2 NZLR 6;
N.Z. Bloodstock, 2 NZLR 7. What is more, in Portacom it was clear that the lessor had
taken proper legal advice about the new law and, apparently, chose to ignore it. See
Portacom, 2 NZLR 5.
44. See discussion supra note 43.
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security law reforms, or at least did not oppose them. 45 How did New
Zealand overcome the "better the devil you know" response which
dominated the Australian scene for so long? The supportive attitude of
the New Zealand legal profession, and the neutrality of New Zealand's
financial institutions (to suggest that financial institutions actively
supported the reforms may be to put it too highly) represented significant
differences from the Australian and British experiences with secured
transactions law reform.
But perhaps the defining difference was the grass-roots involvement
of the legal profession in New Zealand. Senior members of the
profession, who had daily experience of the deficiencies of the old
secured transactions regime, often led the reform initiatives. The Legal
Research Foundation, one of the early promoters of reform, was a joint
venture between practitioners and academics.
The Contracts and
Commercial Law Reform Committee, which in its 1973 report to the
Minister of Justice endorsed the reform proposals, had practitioner
membership. The Government commissioned reports from leading
practitioners in 1982 and 1984. And, perhaps most significantly, when
the Law Commission was tasked with reviewing the law on the
registration of company charges, it initially engaged John Farrar and
Mark O'Regan (then a senior commercial lawyer) to prepare a
preliminary report and subsequently established an advisory committee
of specialists comprising five senior practitioners (two of whom were
later appointed judges and now sit in the Supreme Court and Court of
Appeal) who were partners in five out of the eight largest national law
firms, together with Farrar, David McLauchlan and Bob Dugan.46 The
seniority and calibre of the Advisory Committee's members ensured that
it had immediate credibility.
Although there was no orchestrated promotion of the reform
proposals, the Advisory Committee widely circulated a draft of its report
and was encouraged by the support received from stakeholders. The
Advisory Committee received no opposing submissions. Prior to this,
the recommendation in the Farrar and O'Regan report to adopt an Article
9 regime was presented "and generally applauded ' 47 at a series of
insolvency law seminars across New Zealand.
The New Zealand reformers not only resisted the urge to reinvent
the wheel, but also actively discouraged it. No doubt this was in part due
45. See supra text accompanying note 3.
46. At that the time, Professor Farrar was on the Faculty of Law at University of
Canterbury, Christchurch, while Professor MacLauchlan and Mr. Dugan (not to be
confused with the co-author of the present paper) were both on the Faculty of Law at
Victoria University, Wellington.
47. See Preliminary Paper No. 6, supra note 19.
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to an unrealistic time frame given to the Advisory Committee to submit
its recommendations. After Farrar and O'Regan's preliminary report
recommending the adoption of an Article 9 regime, the Advisory
Committee was given a bare 6 months to come up with a final
recommendation and draft legislation. The Committee, working on a pro
bono basis, essentially met this deadline by working weekends and by
basing the draft legislation on the British Columbia model. However,
officials could not resist the urge to reinvent the wheel. The New
Zealand Ministry of Economic Development's first draft bill departed
radically from the North American model. For example, it based priority
on the time of perfection (rather than the time of registration) and it
required the registration of particulars of individual security agreements
rather than merely details of the prospective collateral. A subcommittee
of the New Zealand Law Society (the New Zealand practitioner body)
spent many hours in meetings with Ministry officials endeavouring to
convince the Ministry to return to the tried and tested48Canadian model
and in the end they substantially succeeded in doing so.
New Zealand's history is characterised by a lack of opposition from
financial institutions and industry groups. This is perhaps surprising
given that all of the major New Zealand banks are Australian owned and
some of the Australian parent banks at least initially opposed similar
reforms in Australia. Some of the Australian bankers' opposition was
engendered by Dr. William Gough, an expert on company floating
charges, who was opposed to the reforms and who advised Australian
banks. Gough also made his views known in New Zealand.49 Perhaps,
however, Australian institutional opposition did not take root cross the
Tasman, because the financial institutions' local legal advisers were

48. Michael Gedye was a member of the New Zealand Law Society subcommittee.
Nevertheless, the Law Society subcommittee was not wholly successful in convincing
New Zealand officials to adopt the Canadian model. Officials insisted on following New
Zealand drafting conventions as well as adopting some other home grown amendments
against the subcommittee's advice. For example, the New Zealand Act lacks any
provisions dealing with fixtures. Furthermore, for no good reason, only first ranking
secured parties were given the fight to enforce security interests. This latter anomaly has
subsequently been rectified. See Personal Property Securities Act 1999 (N.Z.), 1999/126,
s. 109. On the other hand, perversely the subcommittee was responsible for one notable
omission from the New Zealand Act. The draft bill included provisions that were
equivalent to the Canadian provisions dealing with competing priorities when collateral
disposed of by the debtor was subsequently returned to the debtor. For unconvincing
reasons, the subcommittee persuaded officials to delete these provisions from the New
Zealand Act.
49. See, e.g., William J. Gough, The Law Relating to Chattel Security III: Toward a
New System of Business Security Law, N.Z. COMPANY DIRECTOR AND PROF'L ADMIN.,
Nov. 1979, at 72-79.
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already on board with the proposed reforms and were able to steer their
clients away from the Australian point of view.
It is also possible that New Zealand's experience with partial
reforms to its secured transactions laws may have smoothed the way for
more fundamental reform.
For example in 1974 some relatively
insignificant amendments to New Zealand's Chattels Transfer Act
introduced New Zealand practitioners to the concept of the functional
security interest. 50 Moreover, the 1989 Motor Vehicle Securities Act
furthered the partial reforms through the creation of a national
computerised registry and the transparent adoption of the time of
registration as a priority point.51 In this connection, Farrar and
O'Regan's assessment of the Chattels Transfer Act is instructive:
There is a core of good sense in the New Zealand Chattels Transfer
Act.
This is largely the result of indigenous reforms-the
assimilation of bailment and hire purchase, the recognition to some
extent of purchase money security interests, flexible agricultural
securities, facilitation52of stock in trade financing, the protection of the
bona fide purchaser.
In other words, New Zealand had already begun to reform their secured
transaction laws and so the proposal for a fully-fledged Article-9 type
regime may not have seemed such a big step.
IV. THE IMPETUS FOR CHANGE

A.

Australia

There are perhaps three main reasons why the Australian proposals
are now on the verge of success. The first, and most significant, is Philip
Ruddock's conversion to the cause. The lesson the Australasian
experience teaches is that good ideas are not enough and that reforms of
this nature require broad support from within senior levels of government
and from key stakeholders such as the legal profession (as seen in New
Zealand). In Australia, Ruddock's arrival on the scene dramatically
affected the course of events.
The long years beforehand were
characterized by a lack of leadership and commitment. The responsible
government departments assumed a passive role, being prepared to enact
legislation, but only after there were sufficient signs of support from the
50. See s.18A(3) of the now-repealed Chattels Transfer Act, 1924 (N.Z.)
5 1. Before this, time of registration could affect priorities under the Chattels
Transfer Act, but the subject provision was undermined by subsequent provisions where
knowledge was relevant.
52. Preliminary Paper No. 6, supra note 19, at 50.
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banks and other key stakeholders. This was a recipe for inertia, given the
prevalence of the "better the devil you know" attitude, and academics,
for all their efforts, proved powerless to achieve the necessary
momentum. Ruddock put together a team within the Attorney-General's
Department to take control of the agenda. This group has been
remarkably proactive in championing the case for reform and it appears
to have succeeded in brokering a significant measure of stakeholder
consensus. In summary, successful law reform requires a coalition of
seems to have
governments, stakeholders and reformers. Australia now
53
not.
has
clearly
England
whereas
coalition
this
achieved
The second factor shaping the Australian developments has been the
apparent success of the New Zealand PPSA. The fully electronic remote
access New Zealand register has proven to be a significant drawcard with
Australian stakeholder audiences and the Australian reformers have
taken every opportunity to arrange for demonstrations. The observable
efficiency of the New Zealand register as compared to the current
Australian registration arrangements speaks more eloquently to the case
for reform than any law reform report or law review article ever could.
Aside from cases like Portacom and New Zealand Bloodstock, a related
consideration is that financial institutions and legal practitioners in New
Zealand appear to have managed the transition to the new regime without
undue dislocation. The New Zealanders learned quickly to draw on
Canadian secondary materials as an aid to understanding the new law
and this lesson will not have been lost on Australian stakeholders. 5 4 In
sum, the New Zealand developments have played an important part in
reducing the levels of distrust and anxiety that Article 9-type reforms
tend to provoke.

53. It is also noteworthy that personal property security law reform in Australia
achieved a high level of bi-partisan support. Without this development, the project may
have died following the change of government in 2007. Furthermore, the success of a
national scheme depended on the cooperation of the States and Territories, all of which
have had Labor governments since 2005. On the other hand, the Labor Party was not
actively pushing for reform in the pre-Ruddock years and it is open to speculation
whether it would have taken an interest at all had Ruddock not already put the issue on
the political agenda.
54. For example, Mike Gedye teamed with Ron Cuming and Rod Wood to produce a
New Zealand version of Cuming and Wood's very successful PPSA Handbook series.
See generally MICHAEL GEDYE, RONALD C.C. CUMING & RODERICK J. WOOD, PERSONAL
PROPERTY SECURITIES IN NEW ZEALAND (2002); see also LINDA WIDDUP & LAURIE
MAYNE, PERSONAL PROPERTY SECURITIES ACT. A CONCEPTUAL APPROACH (2d ed. 2002).

Linda Widdup is a Canadian legal practitioner, based in Edmonton and Laurie Mayne is a
New Zealand lawyer. Linda Widdup has also collaborated with Tom Telfer on the PPSA
sections of MORISON'S COMPANY AND SECURITY LAW (2004). Tom Telfer is a Canadian

legal academic who taught for some years at the University of Auckland Faculty of Law.
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The third key factor has been the involvement in the Australian
reform process of lawyers, such as Craig Wappett and David
Krasnostein, who have studied or practiced law in the United States and
Canada and are familiar with the Article 9 and PPSA regimes. Wappett
is a long-serving member of the Financial Services Committee of the
Law Council of Australia's Business Law section, while Krasnostein was
until recently Chief General Counsel at the National Australia Bank.
Both have been strong supporters of the case for reform and they have
proven to be influential in converting some, if not all, of their colleagues
to the Article 9 cause.
B.

New Zealand

The commitment to reform the companies' legislation including, but
not limited to, the companies' charges provisions was a factor in the
drive for personal property security law reform in New Zealand. This
commitment to reform, however, was just the catalyst that got the
proposals moving in the wake of many years' criticism of the old secured
transactions regime. The Law Commission put it this way:
The Commission's involvement in reform of this area of the law
stems primarily from the Minister of Justice's request for a review of
the Companies Act 1955 (Part IV of which deals with security
interests created by companies). The need for our involvement has
been reinforced by the weight of comments and submissions made to
the Commission
seeking comprehensive reform of chattel securities
55
law.
Even then, it is likely the reform initiative would have stalled if it
were not for the dedication of the Commission's unpaid Advisory
Committee comprised of senior practitioners and academics. A cynic
might suggest that the Committee was given an unrealistic timeframe to
formulate its recommendations and draft legislation in the expectation
that it would not succeed. However, it took barely six months to produce
a detailed analysis and a draft Act. In its report to the Minister of Justice,
the Law Commission noted:
All members of the [Advisory] Committee are widely experienced
and expert in their professions with great demands upon their
time.... The commitment of the Advisory Committee to the project
is in part indicative of the need for reform in this area, and of current
circumstances favourable to comprehensive and coherent reform.
Prominent among those circumstances are advances in information
55. New Zealand Law Commission, Report No. 8, A Personal Property Securities
Act for New Zealand (NZLC R8), at 1 (1989).
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technology, experience with reform regimes in various Canadian
jurisdictions, and the opportunity provided by a comprehensive
review of the Companies Act 1955.
Nevertheless, the Law Commission's plea for urgency was not
enough to ensure prompt action. Although the Law Commission
envisaged that a Personal Property Securities Act would be "enacted
together with our virtually contemporaneous proposals for a new
Companies Act,",56 this did not occur. Instead, when the Companies Act
was passed in 1993, it was necessary to bring forward, on a temporary
basis, the registration of company charges provisions from the 1955
Companies Act.
While one can assume the Law Commission continued to stir the
pot, the final impetus for reform came from the Ministry of Economic
The MED took over responsibility for
Development ("MED").
commercial law reform from the Ministry of Justice. No doubt mindful
of the need to enact a permanent replacement for the temporary
registration of company charges provisions, the MED would have been
keen to demonstrate its commitment to its new responsibilities, and see
an important reform through to a successful conclusion. After reviewing
the Law Commission's recommendations, the MED advised the
A bill was drafted in 1998 and the legislation
Government to proceed.
57
enacted in 1999.
V.

THE LEGISLATIVE OUTCOMES

A.

Australia

The battle is not yet over and the most recent developments raise the
fear that Australia may yet succeed in snatching defeat from the jaws of
victory. The May 2008 draft Bill reveals, once again, the Australian
lawmakers' propensity for reinventing the wheel. While the Bill takes
the Canadian and New Zealand PPSAs as its starting point, it departs
significantly from the model in terms of organization, terminology and
general style. This is in contrast to the approach the New Zealanders
took, which was for the most part to follow the text of the Saskatchewan
PPSA, 58 and incorporate legislative cross-references to the corresponding
Saskatchewan PPSA provisions.

56. Id. at 4.
57. For the Law Commission's draft Act and commentary, see id. See generally
NZPPSA 1999, supra note 2.
58. Some of the New Zealand departures from the Saskatchewan model are noted in
section 5(b) below.
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As discussed in Part III, the New Zealand approach has substantial
benefits. The Canadian model is a tried and tested one.5 9 It is the
product of lengthy and careful deliberations by leading commercial
lawyers and it has stood the test of time. The Canadian model, in turn, is
based on Article 9 which itself was the product of an exhaustive drafting
process involving some of the finest minds in United States commercial
law. Close adherence to the North American models makes sense
because it enables the local lawmaker to freely utilize Canada's and the
United States' learning and experience. By contrast, departure from the
model creates uncertainty and increases the risk of error. These concerns
are exacerbated if the drafting is done under time constraints and without
access to the kind of expertise the Canadians and Americans had at their
disposal when drafting their laws.
The Australian decision not to follow the North American model is
explained in the commentary which accompanies the Bill as follows:
The differences between the Bill and its international counterparts
reflect issues raised by stakeholders, differences in the Australian
consumer and commercial environment, advances in information
technology, and drafting styles adopted to improve
legal certainty and
60
consistency with Australian drafting practices.
The commentary does not specify what the relevant issues,
differences and advances are, and so it is impossible to test the strength
of this assertion. Moreover, while the Bill may improve legal certainty at
one level, it increases uncertainty at another level; the statement in the
commentary fails to acknowledge this trade-off. The Bill reflects a
strong commitment to drafting precision with a view to ensuring that the
legislation provides for every possible contingency. It is in this sense
that the claim to improved legal certainty is presumably to be
understood. However, a commitment to precision is not cost-free. The
inevitable by-product is longer, more complex legislation.
The
Australian Bill is at least twice as long as the New Zealand and Canadian
PPSAs, it contains numerous definition provisions not found in these
other statutes, and it relies on an elaborate system of forward and back
referencing which means that the reader is constantly having to look at
two or more parts of the legislation at once to get the overall sense of

59.

See Saskatchewan

Personal

Property

Act,

1993

(Can.),

available at

http://www.qp.justice.gov.sk.ca/orphan/legislation/P6-2.htm; see also New Brunswick
Personal
Property
Security
Act,
1993
(Can.),
available
at
http://www.gov.nb.ca/acts/acts/p-07-1 .htm.
60. Personal Property Securities Bill 2008 Commentary
1.16, available at
www.ag.gov.au/pps (follow "PPS Downloads" hyperlink; then follow "Personal Property
Securities Bill 2008 Commentary" hyperlink).
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particular provisions. Furthermore, in the absence of cross-references to
corresponding provisions in the other jurisdictions, readers who want to
know the origins of particular provisions in the Australian Bill are forced
to do their own research. 6'
In summary, while the greater precision of the Australian Bill may
save litigation costs by providing answers to questions that might
otherwise have been left to the courts, it increases the costs of
comprehension and it is not at all clear that the gains exceed the losses.
A relevant question to ask in this connection is how much litigation has
resulted from the perceived lack of precision in the Canadian and New
Zealand PPSAs; particularly in relation to the issues on which the
Australian drafters have thought it necessary to elaborate. The answer is
"surprisingly little" and this at least suggests that the benefits of greater
drafting precision may not be worth the cost.
The complexity of the Australian Bill is itself a source of
uncertainty, but this is compounded by the factors identified above. In
particular, the failure to adhere closely to the North American model will
substantially reduce the usefulness of Canadian case law and secondary
sources as a guide to interpretation, and it will make projects like the
New Zealand/Canadian academic collaboration much less feasible.62 In
short, Australia may be forced to develop its own body of case law and
literature and, in the meantime, parties and their legal advisers will be
left to their own resources in determining what the legislation means.
Again, the question that needs to be addressed is whether these costs are
worth the benefits that flow from the approach the Australian drafters
have taken. There is also the very real concern that the costs of the
Australian approach may erode stakeholder support for the new
legislation by refueling the concerns identified in Part III, and, if that
happens, the costs will end up being political as well as economic.
B.

New Zealand

The New Zealand PPSA is closely modelled after the tried and
tested second generation legislation of the Canadian province of
Saskatchewan.
Many of the New Zealand sections are worded
substantially the same as the corresponding Canadian provisions. But
the New Zealand Act does not slavishly follow the Canadian model; it
differs in structure and in several matters of substance. Some of the
variations represent considered policy choices but others simply reflect
61. The minutia are likely to be of little interest to an international audience, but see
the Appendix infra for a critical discussion of some of the respects in which the
Australian Bill departs from the New Zealand and Canadian models.
62. See supra text accompanying note 54.
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the local New Zealand drafting style and may result in unintended
consequences. Anecdotal evidence suggests that uncertainty is more
likely to arise where New Zealand has, for stylistic reasons, departed
from the Canadian wording. Conversely, it is clear from the New
Zealand cases that the New Zealand court's ability to rely on Canadian
case law has allowed New Zealand law to become settled more quickly
than would otherwise have been the case.
Ultimately, the concepts underpinning the New Zealand Act, as
with its Canadian parent, are derived from Article 9 of the American
UCC. The American functional definition of security interest and the
key concepts of attachment, perfection, and the reliance on the time of
registration as a priority point are all replicated in the New Zealand Act.
Two of the more significant New Zealand departures from the North
American approach are:
1. Greater emphasis is placed on the time of registration as a
priority point. Various North American priority rules that
turn on the giving of notice or the absence of knowledge of
a competing interest have not been adopted in New
Zealand.63 The New Zealand approach is less nuanced than
the North American one, but it has the advantage of greater
simplicity and certainty and avoids evidential difficulties
over the giving of notice and the existence of knowledge;
2. In New Zealand, an unperfected security interest is effective
against a trustee in bankruptcy. This departure from the
North American position is the most controversial aspect of
the New Zealand Act. It probably came about in part
because of the tight deadline imposed on the Law
Commission's Advisory Committee. In the time available,
the Committee was unable to reach consensus on the
subject and noted that it was almost evenly divided on the
issue. The pros and cons of the New Zealand approach
have been set out elsewhere, 64 but the most visible (or
perhaps more accurately, invisible) consequence is a
reduction in the amount of PPSA litigation. The plethora of
North American cases where a trustee in bankruptcy has
challenged a defective registration cannot arise in New
Zealand.

63. Under s.74 of the NZ Act, in order to take priority, the holder of a purchase
money security interest is not required to give notice to the holder of a prior security
interest. Under s.52 of the NZ Act, a buyer takes free of a prior unperfected security
interest whether or not the buyer knew of the earlier interest.
64. See GEDYE, CUMING & WOOD, supra note 54, at 5.
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One useful feature of the New Zealand Act is the cross-referencing
of each section to the equivalent Canadian provision on which the New
Zealand section is based. A standard text on the New Zealand Act 65 has
taken this a step further by cross-referencing the New Zealand sections to
multiple Canadian jurisdictions as well as to both the pre and post 1999
versions of Article 9. This allows New Zealand practitioners and judges
easy access to relevant North American legislation and cases.
CONCLUSION

VI.

The Australian and New Zealand experiences tell a similar story
about the recipe for successful personal property security law reform.
Sound policy arguments alone are not enough. Successful law reform
requires a coalition of government, stakeholders and reformers. In
Australia, there had been support for reform from within academic
circles for many years, but the impetus for change did not come until the
Commonwealth Attorney-General enthusiastically adopted the cause in
2005. His intervention provided the political leadership necessary to win
over stakeholders and neutralize the anti-reform lobby.
In New Zealand, the sequence of events was slightly different, but
the end result was the same. There, the impetus for reform came from
within the legal profession itself, and this came about at least in part
because leading commercial law practitioners were involved in
developing the proposals from the outset. In other words, the profession
had an ownership stake in the reform agenda and so they did not have to
be sold on the reform, as was the case in Australia and England. The
government commitment came later through the agency of the Ministry
of Economic Development which had its own reasons for wanting the
enterprise to succeed.
In both countries, reformers have had to grapple with the urge
within government circles to reinvent the wheel. It is not at all clear
what basis the local Parliamentary Counsel and their advisers had for
thinking that they could do better than the tried and tested model;
particularly when they were working under tight time constraints and
without access to the range of expertise the American and Canadian
drafters had at their disposal. In any event, the New Zealanders by and
large managed in the end to overcome the temptation and are now
reaping the benefits. On the other hand, the Australians have not, and
may, as a consequence, end up reaping the whirlwind.

65.

See id.
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POSTSCRIPT
The Australian government has announced that, following public
consultation, it is likely that there will be "some refinement" to various
aspects of the [draft Personal Property Securities Bill]. 66 The redrafted
Bill was not available at the time of writing, but it was released not long
before this article went to press.67 The Bill has been referred to the
Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs for
review and the committee is due to report by February 24, 2009. The
revised draft does not address the concerns raised in this article.

66.
67.

Property Securities Bill 2008, supra note 14,
Personal Property Securities Bill 2008: Exposure Draft (10 November 2008).
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APPENDIX
EXTRACT FROM ANTHONY DUGGAN, SUBMISSION TO THE AUSTRALIAN

ATTORNEY-GENERAL 'S DEPARTMENT ON PERSONAL PROPERTY SECURITIES
BILL 2008 (MAY, 2008).

(a) Introduction
The following are some selective comments on particular provisions
in the Bill. I cannot claim to have undertaken a comprehensive review of
the legislation.
A comprehensive review would require careful
comparison of the Bill with the New Zealand and Canadian PPSAs
and.., it would involve asking the following questions of each
provision:
(1) is there a corresponding provision in the other
jurisdictions and, if so, is the wording the same? (2) If the wording is
different, is the meaning the same? (3) If the meaning is different, was
this an intended or unintended consequence and is it justifiable? This
kind of analysis would take months and far more resources than I, and I
suspect most stakeholders, have at my disposal. The problem is that
without this kind of analysis, it is impossible to be sure that the
Australian Bill is an improvement on the other models. The best I can do
in the time available to me is focus on a few issues I have identified with
a view to demonstrating the main point, which is the danger of departing
from a tried and true model, particularly when drafting under time
constraints and without the opportunity for careful deliberation and
consultation.
(b) Changes in taxonomy
The Canadian and New Zealand PPSAs, following Article 9, divide
personal property into 7 categories (chattel paper, documents of title,
goods, intangibles, investment securities, money and negotiable
instruments) and they further subdivide goods into consumer goods,
equipment and inventory. This taxonomy serves an important function
in the overall scheme of the legislation.
The Australian Bill adopts a different taxonomy. It divides personal
property into: (1) intangible property, (2) tangible property and
(3) chattel paper, documents of title, investment instruments, currency
and negotiable instruments. It further divides personal property into
"consumer property," "equipment" and "inventory."
"Tangible
property" is essentially, goods including fixtures and the like.
These changes were presumably made with specific policy
objectives in mind, and they may or may not be an improvement on the
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Canadian and New Zealand models. The problem is that this can only be
determined by a painstaking analysis of the Bill as a whole read in
conjunction with the New Zealand and Canadian model. In other words,
while there may be benefits in attempting to improve on the established
model, there are also costs and the drafters of the Bill appear to have
discounted the costs. The costs are increased uncertainty (because we
cannot be sure that the outcomes of the new taxonomy are the same as
the outcomes of the old one) and increased risk (because we cannot be
sure that the shift to the new taxonomy will not have undesirable
commercial implications). The drafters themselves may be confident on
both these fronts, but that is little consolation to parties and their legal
advisers confronted with the choice of either doing their own research to
be on the safe side or, alternatively, running the risk.
(c) Definitions
The substitution of "tangible property" for "goods" is open to
question. The justification, presumably, was that it is misleading to
define goods as including fixtures and the like. On the other hand,
referring to goods as "tangible property" throughout the legislation is a
potential source of confusion because the reader is constantly required to
remind herself what the expression means.
The New Zealand and Canadian PPSAs use the expressions
"secured party" and "debtor" to describe the parties to a security
agreement and they define "debtor" to include a third party who provides
security in support of the loan. The Australian Bill substitutes "grantor"
for "debtor" and it defines grantor to include both the debtor and a third
party who provides security in support of the loan. The thinking,
presumably, was that it is misleading to define "debtor" as including a
third party. On the other hand, referring to the debtor as the grantor
throughout the legislation is a potential source of confusion because the
reader must constantly remind herself what the expression means.
Perhaps more importantly, the expression "grantor" is inappropriate for
title retention transactions and it is an additional source of confusion and
potential misunderstanding for this reason. It is not hard to envisage
counsel making the argument that, notwithstanding the functional
definition of "security interest" in s.21, the repeated references in the
legislation to "the grantor" signify an intention to limit the scope to the
traditional forms of security.
The Bill defines "registered" by reference to registration of the
collateral, rather than the security interest and it follows through with this
approach in other provisions, such as s.60(2), which refers to
"registration of the collateral" and s.194(1) which refers to "registration
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of personal property as collateral." By contrast, the New Zealand and
Canadian PPSAs refer to registration of the security interest. It is unclear
why the Australian drafters took a different approach and the
Commentary provides no clues.
Registration is one method of perfection. The legislation refers to
perfection of the "security interest." To speak of perfecting "the
collateral" would be nonsensical. Given that registration is a method of
perfection and that the subject-matter of perfection is the security
interest, it is conceptually odd to speak of registration of the collateral
instead. Perhaps another way of making the same point is to say that
what searchers of the register are looking for is not collateral but, rather,
security interests.
There is a similar confusion between the security interest and the
collateral in other parts of the Bill. For example, s.24(3) provides that:
If a security interest secures both purchase money collateral and
collateral that is not purchase money collateral, the security interest is
a purchase money security interest only to the extent that it secures
the purchase money collateral.
What it should say is that:
A security interest in both purchase money collateral and collateral
that is not purchase money collateral is a purchase money security
interest only to the extent that it is in the purchase money collateral.
The New Zealand and Canadian PPSAs use the expression "financing
statement" to describe the instrument for registering a security interest.
The Australian Bill uses the expression "registration" instead. It is
unclear why the drafters made this change and the Commentary offers no
clues. One problem with the Australian approach is that the Bill uses
"registration" in two different senses: first to describe a method of
perfection and second, to describe the registration instrument. This is, at
best, a potential source of confusion and, at worst, a potential source of
unintended consequences.
(d) Conflict of laws
The conflict of laws provisions in Part 2, Div.7 of the Australian
Bill differ substantially in form and, I suspect, also in substance from the
New Zealand and Canadian PPSAs. The Canadians have been unable to
achieve uniform provincial PPSAs, much less national legislation, but
they have at least managed to achieve uniform conflict of laws rules and
a high level of harmonization with the conflict of laws rules in Article 9.
Uniform conflict of laws rules are important to ensure that the outcomes
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of choice of law disputes do not vary depending on the jurisdiction in
which the litigation takes place.
Australia will avoid conflicts problems at the inter-state level, given
that its proposed PPSA is a national one, but there is still the potential for
conflict of laws issues to arise at the international level (for example,
between Australia and New Zealand). Closer Economic Relations
between Australia and New Zealand was an early impetus for personal
property security law reform in Australia, and the CER agenda dictates
harmonization of laws. In the absence of uniform conflict of laws rules
between Australia and New Zealand, there is a risk of different choice of
law outcomes depending on whether the case is litigated in Australia or
New Zealand. This prospect is hardly in the spirit of CER.
(e) Investment entitlements
The Canadian provinces are in the process of enacting uniform
securities transfer legislation, modeled on Article 8 of the United States
Uniform Commercial Code. The new legislation contains detailed rules
governing the transfer of both directly and indirectly held securities. The
legislation refers to the investor's interest in indirectly held securities as
a "security entitlement" and it goes on to specify that the investor has a
proportionate proprietary interest in the intermediary's holding of the
securities in question. It also gives the investor a set of personal rights
exercisable against the intermediary for breach of the duties the
intermediary owes investors. These rights in combination, make up the
"security entitlement" and they are what the investor gets in return for
her investment. Cognate reforms to the PPSAs are aimed at facilitating
security interests in investment property. The PPSA definition of
"investment property" expressly includes a security entitlement. Other
parts of the Act spell out the rules for attachment of a security interest in
a security entitlement and other kinds of investment property. They also
stipulate what the secured party should do to perfect its security interest
in investment property and they enact special priority rules for disputes
between the holder of a security interest in investment property and
competing claims.
"Investment entitlement" is defined in s.50(7) of the Australian Bill
to mean, in effect, an investment held by an investor in the indirect
holding system. The provision refers to "an interest" in a financial
product evidenced by registering the owner on books maintained by a
securities intermediary. However, it fails to specify what the interest is
and there is no equivalent to Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code
or the Canadian Securities Transfer Acts to fill the gap. Perhaps such
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legislation is under consideration in Australia, but the Commentary
makes no mention of it and, in the meantime, the question is at large.
Moreover, the Bill contains no provisions equivalent to the new
Canadian PPSA provisions mentioned above. In other words, there are
no special provisions for the attachment or perfection of security interests
in an investment entitlement or for dealing with priority disputes
involving investment entitlements. The Bill does make special provision
for security interests in an investment instrument, including provision for
perfection by control and priority rules giving precedence to security
interests perfected by control over security interests perfected by other
methods. However, the definition of "investment instrument" does not
include an investment entitlement and so none of these provisions apply.
So far as I have been able to discover, the only provision in the Bill
relating specifically to investment entitlements is the conflict of laws rule
in s.50. Given, this, what is the Bill's impact on security interests in an
investment entitlement? An investment entitlement would fall within the
definition of "intangible property" and so, presumably, it would be
subject to the legislation on that basis and all the ordinary rules relating
to a security interest in intangible property would apply.
One
consequence is that it would be possible to perfect the security interest by
registration, but not control and so the advantages of perfection by
control would not be available to the secured party. As a matter of
policy it does not make sense to discriminate in this way between
security interests in directly and indirectly held investments. Another
concern is that the failure to specify the nature of the investor's interest
in an indirectly held investment means that a prospective secured party
cannot be sure of what it is getting and this, too, may act as a
disincentive to security interests in indirectly held investments. It is
unclear from either the Bill or the Commentary whether the drafters were
aware of these concerns and, if so, what plans, if any, are in train to
address them.
0 Acquiringpersonalpropertyfree of security interests
Part 5 of the Bill combines provisions modeled on the New Zealand
and Canadian PPSAs and provisions drawn from the Australian state
REVs legislation without proper regard to the potential for overlap and
inconsistencies. For example, s.86(l), which derives from the REVs
laws, overlaps substantially with s.81, which derives from the New
Zealand and Canadian PPSAs. Likewise, s. 86(2), imported from the
REVs laws, overlaps with s.82 (the sales in ordinary course provision).
Both sets of provisions are directed to the same questions and enacting
them both smacks of overkill as well as adding unnecessarily to the
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length and complexity of the legislation. The drafters may have taken
the view that the PPSA-based provisions do not sufficiently protect the
consumer-and there are grounds for that concern (particularly in the
case where the end purchaser does not buy the goods directly from the
debtor). However, a simpler response would have been to make
appropriate adjustments to the PPSA-derived provisions, rather than to
enact a new layer of provisions on top.
The provisions in Part 5 switch between references to the
transferee's knowledge of the security interest and the transferee's
knowledge that the transfer is in breach of the security agreement but
without any clear indication as to why. In the case of the buyer in
ordinary course provision (s.82), the appropriate question is whether the
buyer knew that the transfer constituted a breach of the security
agreement. This is because the provision typically applies to the case
where the subject-matter of the transaction is inventory. In these
circumstances, the buyer's knowledge of the security interest is neither
here nor there because, provided the sale is in the ordinary course of the
transferor's business, the buyer will reasonably expect to take free of the
security interest in any event. What does matter in this context is
whether the transfer is in breach of the authority the secured party has
given the debtor-transferor to sell its inventory and the purpose of the
provision is to prevent the buyer from being prejudiced by unpublicized
restrictions on the transferor's authority to sell. Section 82 accurately
reflects these considerations.
However, the considerations behind the other provisions in Part 5 of
the Bill are different. The other provisions are directed to the case
where, for one reason or another, the buyer has no means of discovering
the security interest (for example, because the security interest is
unperfected, or because the registration has omitted the serial number or
because in the circumstances it would be unreasonable to expect the
buyer to conduct a register search). In these cases, the relevant question
is whether the buyer knew about the security interest anyway. On this
basis, the references in ss 80, 81, 83, 84, 85, 86 and 87 should all be to
the transferee's knowledge of the security interest and, as presently
drafted, ss 83-87 have it right, but ss 80 and 81 do not. Incidentally,
there is a similar error in s.28(5) of the Ontario PPSA and this may be the
source of the confusion in the Australian Bill.
Section 81 provides for cases where the secured party omits the
serial number from the registration, or gets it wrong. If the regulations
follow the Canadian and New Zealand model, inclusion of the serial
number will be mandatory for consumer goods but optional for
equipment and inventory. On this basis, s.81 should be limited to cases
where the collateral is equipment. If the collateral is consumer goods,
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omission or misdescription of the serial number will invalidate the
registration. This means the security interest is unperfected, s.80 applies
and s.81 is not needed. If the collateral is inventory, the transferee will
typically take free of the security interest even if it is perfected and so,
again, s.81 is not needed. The corresponding provision in the Canadian
PPSAs is directed to the case where the security interest is in equipment
and the secured party knows the serial number at the time of registration.
The purpose of the provision is to give the secured party an incentive to
include the serial number even though failure to include it does not
invalidate the registration. The drafting of the provision should reflect
this objective.
(g)Fixtures, accessions and commingled goods
Part 8, Div.2 contains provisions governing competing claims to
fixtures. All the PPSAs except New Zealand have corresponding
provisions. The New Zealand PPSA's failure to provide for fixtures
means that in cases involving a priority dispute between the holder of a
security interest in a fixture and the holder of an interest in the land, the
court will have to revert to the common law rules. By contrast, in
Canada, the rules are codified in the statute, they are clear and accessible
and they give effect to the parties' likely commercial expectations. The
rules vary depending on whether: (1) the security interest attaches before
or after the goods become a fixture; and (2) the competing party acquired
its interest in the land before or after the goods became a fixture.
For example, if the security interest attached before the goods
became a fixture and the competing party had already acquired its
interest in the land before the goods became a fixture, the security
interest has priority. The rationale is that otherwise the competing party
would get a windfall at the secured party's expense because the
competing party would not have had the fixture in mind at the time it
acquired its interest in the land. Note that in this case, the secured
party's priority does not depend on perfection: attachment is sufficient.
On the other hand, if the goods become a fixture before the competing
party acquires its interest in the land and the security interest has already
attached at that point, the competing party has priority unless the secured
party filed a notice of its interest in the Land Registry Office before the
competing party's acquisition. The rationale is that, in the absence of
notice, the competing party is likely to assume that its acquisition
includes the fixture. Note that in this case, the secured party's priority
depends on registration, not in the PPS register, but in the Land Registry
Office. This is the place where a prospective purchaser of the land is
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most likely to search and it avoids the need for prospective land
purchasers to search twice.
The fixtures provisions in the Australian Bill are worded quite
differently from the Canadian model. It is unclear whether the drafters
changed the wording simply to improve the clarity, whether the change
in wording was intended to change the meaning and, whether or not the
drafters intended to change the meaning, they have done so anyway. The
Canadian provisions have been tried and tested and it makes no sense to
adopt a different model unless there are clear policy reasons for doing so.
Neither the Bill nor the Commentary suggests any such reason.
Paragraph 12 of the Commentary asks whether the Bill should include
fixtures provisions along the lines of those included in the draft Bill. The
answer is, yes, the Bill should include fixtures provisions (for the reasons
stated above) but, no, not along the lines of the provisions in the Bill.
The same observations apply to the provisions in Part 8, Div. 3 of
the Bill governing competing claims to accessions and to the provisions
in Div.4 relating to commingled goods.
(The priority rules for
competing security interests in commingled goods (ss 150-152) are
significantly different from the Canadian and New Zealand PPSAs and
decidedly more complex).
Section 146 limits the secured party's rights in the product or mass
to "the value of the obligation" immediately before the commingling.
The reference should be to the value of the secured party's collateral
immediately before the commingling.
As presently drafted, the
provision gives a windfall to the secured party who is under-secured.
In a departure from the New Zealand and Canadian PPSAs, s.147
requires the secured party to reperfect its security interest following the
commingling within a prescribed grace period. As the Commentary
explains, the rationale is to ensure consistency with the perfection
requirements for security interests in proceeds. The s. 147 grace period is
"5 business days after the secured party acquires the knowledge required
to perfect [or reperfect]" and s.148 defines "knowledge" to mean
information the secured party could have acquired through making
reasonable inquiries."
There is substantial uncertainty in these
provisions, particularly in relation to what amounts to "reasonable
inquiries." For example, monitoring of the debtor's operations may
enable the secured party to discover the commingling. Do ss 147 and
148 require monitoring and, if so, to what degree? The answers to these
questions may vary from case to case, depending on the secured party's
level of sophistication and resources. In advance of litigation, the
secured party may have no way of predicting the status of its security
interest in the end product and this uncertainty is likely to affect both its
willingness to give the debtor credit and the amount of its charges. Of
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course, there is an offsetting consideration which is that, in the absence
of a reperfection requirement, other prospective secured lenders may
have no way of discovering the secured party's interest in the product or
mass and this may affect both the prospective secured lender's
willingness to deal with the debtor and the amount of its charges.
Paragraph 8.47 of the Commentary asks whether it is appropriate to
confer temporary perfection on commingled goods. The answer is that it
is impossible to know, without reliable empirical evidence as to the costs
of doing so relative to the costs of not doing so. It can at least be said,
though, that the absence of a reperfection requirement for commingled
goods does not appear to have caused undue commercial disruption in
Canada and, in the absence of better evidence, the safest course is
probably to follow the Canadian lead.
(h) Notice requirements
Section 154 applies where there is a security interest in a fixture or
accession and the secured party proposes to remove the collateral. The
provision requires the secured party to give notice to various persons. In
the case of a fixture, the secured party must give notice to the landowner.
The Canadian PPSA requirement is broader: the secured party must
notify not just the landowner, but any party with an interest in the land
and this would include, for example, a mortgagee or tenant. There are
obvious reasons why such parties should be entitled to notice and it is
unclear why the Australian Bill overlooks them.
In the case of an accession, s. 154 requires the secured party to give
notice to "any person who has a registration describing the [host goods]."
The Canadian PPSA requirement is broader: the secured party must also
notify any person the secured party knows to have an interest in the host
goods and this would include, for example, the owner or a lessee. Again,
there are obvious reasons why such parties should be entitled to notice
and it is unclear why the Australian Bill overlooks them.
Section 163 of the Bill permits contracting out of the s.154 notice
requirements, but the contract would presumably have to be between the
secured party and the person who would otherwise be entitled to the
notice, rather than between the secured party and the debtor. Contrast
s.96 (subordination agreements), which makes it clear that a
subordination provision in the security agreement is enforceable by the
intended beneficiary.
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(i)
Remedies
Section 163 allows for contracting out of the enforcement
provisions in non-consumer transactions. This distinction makes sense in
relation to provisions that benefit the debtor. However, some of the
provisions s. 163 lists are for the benefit of third parties, not the debtor:
for example, s.154, which requires notice to the landowner before
removal of a fixture, and s. 169, which requires notice to higher priority
parties. Whether or not the security agreement is a consumer transaction
has no obvious bearing on these third party rights.
Section 164 provides that the remedies provisions do not apply to
receivers. The intention, apparently, is to avoid overlap with the
provisions governing receivers in the Corporations Act. However, a
receiver who is appointed to enforce a secured party's security interest
should be under the same obligations as the secured party itself.
Otherwise, receivership may be used simply as a device for avoiding the
PPSA enforcement provisions. The PPSA would be a better location
than the Corporations Act for the provisions governing receivers first,
because the power to appoint a receiver is not limited to cases where the
debtor is a corporation and secondly, for the sake of a complete PPSA.
Section 168 deals with the enforcement of a security interest in
liquid assets, accounts, chattel paper and the like and it provides that the
secured party may "give a written notice to any person obligated on the
collateral requiring the person to discharge the secured obligation."
There is a corresponding provision in the New Zealand and Canadian
PPSAs, but the wording is different. What the provision should say, as it
does in the other PPSAs, is that the secured party may require the obligor
to pay the amount of the obligation to the secured party. In other words,
the reference should be to the obligation the obligor owes to the debtor,
not the obligation the debtor owes to the secured party.
Sections 181-185 deal with the secured party's right of foreclosure.
There are corresponding provisions in the New Zealand and Canadian
PPSAs. However, in contrast to the other PPSAs, the Bill fails to state
that foreclosure extinguishes the debt obligation: in other words, the
secured party takes the collateral in full satisfaction of the secured
obligation. The secured party's right of foreclosure is subject to
objection by the debtor and other interested parties but, in contrast to the
Canadian PPSAs, the Bill gives the secured party no right to challenge an
objection. The secured party can request the objector to provide
evidence of his interest, but if the objector complies, that is the end of the
matter. The Canadian PPSAs allow the secured party to dispute an
objection on the ground that it is frivolous or vexatious, or that the value
of the collateral is less than the outstanding amount of the debt.
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6)Registration
Section 228 provides for register searches against the secured
party's name, the debtor's name, the debtor's ABN, the collateral serial
number and any other criteria the regulations specify. This is more
generous to searchers than the Canadian PPSAs, which provide for
search only against the debtor's name and the collateral serial number.
The problem with providing for multiple search options is that, while it
no doubt benefits searchers, it also increases the burden on the secured
party at the time of registration. A mistake in any of the search criteria is
a seriously misleading error and it will invalidate the financing
statement. It follows that the more search criteria the legislation allows
for, the greater the risk of error for the secured party. With these
concerns in mind, the wisdom of providing for searches against the ABN
and the secured party's name is questionable.
In my submission on Discussion Paper 3, I said the following:
"In my submission on Discussion Paper 1, Registration and Search
Issues, I argued in favour of a debtor's name index, coupled with a
serial number index, along the lines of the Canadian and New
Zealand models. I have since come round to Simon Begg's thinking,
namely that, the first of these indexes should be based on the ABN
rather than the debtor's name. The implication is that security
interests in consumer goods would not be registrable unless the goods
are serial-numbered goods, in which case the security interest would
be registrable against the serial number. In the case of a dispute
between the holder of an unregistrable security interest and a
subsequent purchaser, the purchaser would win provided she
purchased the goods for value, in good faith and without knowledge
of the security interest and provided also that the security interest was
not perfected by possession at the time of the purchase. However,
this rule would be subject to a cut-off figure of, say, $30,000: if the
purchaser paid more than the cut-off figure, she would take the goods
subject to the security interest: compare Chattel Securities Act 1987
(Vic.), s 7(1) and (5). In the likely rare case of a dispute between
two or more unregistrable security interests, priority would depend in
the first place on whether any of the competing security interests is
perfected by possession or temporarily perfected. Otherwise, priority
would turn on the order of attachment. If one of the competing
security interests is a purchase-money security interest, it would have
priority. An unregistrable security interest would have priority over
execution creditors and it would not be ineffective in the debtor's
bankruptcy.

20091

PERSONAL PROPERTY SECURITY LAW REFORM

One advantage of providing for registration against the ABN, rather
than the debtor's name, is that it avoids the need for elaborate rules
identifying the correct name for registration and search purposes. It
also avoids the privacy concerns which have been raised at various
points in the Discussion Papers. The main disadvantage, as indicated
above, is that it would result in security interests given by a nonbusiness debtor being unregistrable, unless the collateral is serialnumbered goods. However, the importance of this consideration
should not be over-stated. The consideration matters most if the
collateral is valuable, because then the disputing parties have more to
lose. However, motor vehicles are by far and away the most common
form of high value collateral given by non-business debtors and
security interests in motor vehicles would be registrable in the serialnumber index. A second disadvantage is that there would need to be
special extinguishment and priority rules for disputes involving
unregistrable security interests and there is no precedent for such
provisions in any of the current PPSAs. However, again as noted
above, there is a partial precedent for such provisions in the Victorian
and Western Australian Chattel Securities Acts, and this legislation
provides a useful model to build on. In this connection, it might be
worthwhile asking banking and finance industry representatives
whether, based on their experience with the Chattel Securities Acts
over the past twenty years, they would be comfortable with the idea
of making security interests in consumer goods other than serialnumbered goods unregistrable, assuming a set of priority rules along
the lines outlined above.
I still hold these views, but the Bill does not reflect them. My proposal is
for registration and search against the debtor's ABN instead of
registration and search against the debtor's name. By contrast, the Bill
provides for both.
(k) Miscellaneous
In common with Article 9 and the Canadian PPSAs, but in contrast
to New Zealand, the Bill invalidates an unperfected security interest in
the debtor's bankruptcy or liquidation. The policy justification for this is
to make sure that the entitlements of execution creditors relative to the
holder of an unperfected security interest are the same inside and outside
bankruptcy and to prevent the holder of an unperfected security interest
from using the bankruptcy laws opportunistically as a means of obtaining
a priority position it does not have outside bankruptcy: Re Giffen [1998]
1 SCR 91 (SCC). In contrast to all the other PPSAs, the Bill also
provides that a security interest is void if the debtor is a company and
goes into liquidation or administration or executes a deed of
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arrangement, unless the security interest was continuously perfected
during the preceding 6 months. The Commentary does not explain the
policy behind this provision, except to say that it comes from the
Corporations Act. Nor does it explain why the rule only applies if the
debtor is a company.
Section 238 applies to non-security leases and consignments.
Section 238(2) provides that if the lessor's or consignor's interest is void
under s.237, the lessor or consignor is taken to have suffered loss or
damage and may recover compensation. However, the provision does
not indicate who the prospective defendant might be. Typically, if s.237
applies, the lessor or consignor will have only themselves to blame for
failing to perfect their security interest and it is hard to see who else
should bear the responsibility. Perhaps the section means that the lessor
or consignor has a claim in the debtor's bankruptcy or liquidation for the
amount of its loss, but the language does not seem appropriate for this
purpose and, besides, it is hard to see any reason in principle why the
lessor or consignor should have such a claim. Section 238(3) provides
that "despite section 237, the leased or consigned property remains the
property of the lessor or consignor." This is tantamount to saying that
s.237 does not apply at all to the transactions in question: if the property
still belongs to the lessor or consignor, it follows that they may recover it
from the debtor's liquidator or trustee in bankruptcy. In that event, of
course, the lessor or consignor will have suffered no loss and so there
will be no basis for any compensation claim under s.238(2).
The reasons for this excess of kindness towards lessors and
consignors are unclear, but the provision may have been drafted to allay
concerns about unfair surprise arising from NDG Pine Ltd (in
Receivership) v. Portacom NZ Ltd [2004]2 NZLR 528 and Agnew &
Waller v. New Zealand Bloodstock [2005] 2 NZLR 549. However, the
concerns these cases have prompted are misconceived. The potential for
unfair surprise in the new laws is no more than an aspect of the transition
costs parties face in adapting to the new regime. These transition costs
are justifiable on the assumption that they will be outweighed by the
benefits of the new law in the longer-term. Moreover, the problem will
likely prove to be self-correcting. It should take only one or two cases
like Portacom and New Zealand Bloodstock for lessors, suppliers and
consignors to get the message that the new law applies to them and that
they need to register financing statements. It can safely be predicted that
there will not be too many more cases like this in New Zealand and that
the courts will be free to turn their attention to more interesting
questions. The same goes for Australia.

